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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROCLAIMS THAT IT WILL NEITHER FORGIVE  
NOR FORGET THOSE WHO WAGE WAR 
 
Shantel Talbot 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It was a warm and sunny day on the beautiful island of Cyprus. In 
direct contrast to the serene surroundings, men, women, and children 
frantically fled their childhood homes, in hopes of reaching safety by 
going undetected by the invading Turkish troops.1 However, many did 
not make it.  
 
Witness Mrs[.] K said that on July 21, 1974, the second 
day of the Turkish invasion, she and a group of villagers 
from Elia were captured when, fleeing from 
bombardment, they tried to reach a range of mountains. 
All 12 men arrested were civilians. They were separated 
from the women and shot in front of the women, under 
the orders of a Turkish officer. Some of the men were 
holding children, three of whom were wounded.2  
 
Standing before the European Commission of Human Rights, one 
witness after another told story after story of needless bloodshed and 
various other human rights violations the Turkish troops committed 
during the invasion of Cyprus from July to August 1974.3 Scores of 
people last seen in the custody of these Turkish soldiers are still missing 
and are presumed to be dead.4   
Cyprus brought an inter-state case before the European Court of 
Human Rights (the Court), and the Court handed down its principal 
judgment in 2001.5 For various reasons, including a letter from the Court 
advising Cyprus not to pursue a just satisfaction6 claim at that time, the 																																								 																					
1 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Report of the Commission), App. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 482 and 556, ¶ 112 (1976), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-142540 [hereinafter Report of the 
Commission]. 
2 The terrible secrets of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, SUNDAY TIMES (Jan. 23, 1977), 
http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/sundaytimes.html (last visited Sept 19, 2015). See also 
Report of the Commission, supra note 1, at ¶ 320. 
3 See Report of the Commission, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 60–75.  
4  See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 16 (2014), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-144151#{"itemid":["001-144151"]} (¶ 
48). 
5  See Cyprus v. Turkey (Principal Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 99 (2001), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59454#{"itemid":["001-59454"]} (§ 
VIII). 
6 “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, 
and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be 
made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party . . . that is to say a 
sum of money by way of compensation for [sustained] damage.” European Convention for the 
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issue of just satisfaction was not brought before the Court with this initial 
claim.7 In 2014, some four decades after the initial violation, the Court 
finally ruled against Turkey in an inter-State application for just 
satisfaction.8  
By applying Article 419 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights to an inter-State case and awarding just satisfaction in the form of 
€90,000,000 punitive damages to Cyprus, the Court’s unprecedented 
ruling in Cyprus v. Turkey broadens the scope of the Court’s authority 
and involvement in corralling errant nations.  
The Court’s judges make their intentions and hopes for the nature of 
this judgment well-known through their concurring and dissenting 
opinions.10 This is the first inter-State case to be brought before the Court 
seeking just satisfaction, and therefore, this judgment is influential in 
crystallizing a new trend in general international law of proffering 
remedies in inter-State cases.11 This case is a platform from which the 
Court pronounced its dedication to punishing errant member States 
through pecuniary damages, regardless of how much time has passed 
since the actual violations occurred.12  
Turkey, as a member of the Council of Europe, is bound to follow 
the Court’s judgment and to make reparations for any human rights 
violations that it commits.13 However, Turkey has taken a dismissive 
stance towards this judgment. 14  The consequences that accompany 
dismissing a judgment and the likelihood that the Court will enforce 
them vary widely. While Turkey can withstand some of this 
condemnation because of its more recent political isolation, many less 
isolated countries, particularly those belonging to the European Union 
(E.U.), may not be able to dismiss such a ruling so easily.15 
The purpose of this Comment is to outline the current ruling’s 
implications for both the Court and States (countries) that choose to 
violate human rights. Following the introduction of the topic in Part I, 
Part II lays out a concise history of the Cyprus Island. Specifically, it 
focuses on the settlement of Cyprus, examines the time period leading up 
to the partition of Cyprus in 1974 from a modern point of view, reviews 
the country’s political climate from the Turkish invasion to the Grand 																																								 																																								 																																								 																
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 41, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. 5, available 
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter Convention]. 
7 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (¶ 3). 
8 Id. 
9 Convention, supra note 6, at art. 41 (defining just satisfaction). 
10 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23–41 (concurring and dissenting).  
11 Id. at 13 (¶ 39). 
12 Id. at 30–37 (¶¶ 12–19) (Albuquerque, J., concurring). 
13 Convention, supra  note 6, at art. 46. 
14  See Alexander Christie-Miller, Its EU dream thwarted, Turkey rejects 90 million-euro 
Cyprus fine, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 13, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2014/0513/Its-EU-dream-thwarted-Turkey-rejects-90-million-euro-Cyprus-fine. 
15 Mark Lowen, Erdogan's 'New Turkey' drifts towards isolation, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30111043. 
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Chamber’s primary inter-State judgment against Cyprus in 2001, and 
examines the Court’s May 2014 ruling on Article 41. Part II also 
contains a brief explanation of Turkey’s legal responsibility to comply 
with the aforementioned judgments. 
Part III outlines the ways in which the Court expands its powers with 
this latest judgment. Furthermore, it focuses on how the Court solidifies 
an international law principle to favor applying compensatory damages 
to inter-State cases, and how it thus expanded the remedies available for 
it to prescribe. Part III also discusses how the Court may apply this new 
prescription of powers to other countries and incidents occurring in the 
world today.  
Finally, Part IV addresses Turkey’s reaction to the case, and whether 
or not Turkey’s reaction diminishes the Court’s influence. 
 
II. CYPRUS: A SUCCINCT MODERN HISTORY 
 
The balance of power on the island of Cyprus bespeaks change, as it 
has shifted fairly steadily since its first inhabitants, the Mycenaean-
Archaean Greeks, settled there in the ninth millennium BC.16 Cyprus 
experienced a long list of alien powers under the rule of foreign invaders, 
including the Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Macedonians, 
Romans, Franks, Venetians, British, and Ottoman Turks.17 Perhaps the 
most significant shift occurred when the Ottoman Turkish troops 
invading Cyprus in 1570, eventually annexed it, and remained in power 
until 1878, when they turned the island’s administration over to the 
British in exchange for protection against a possible Russian invasion.18 
Despite the Turk’s annexation, at least part of the island retained its 
Greek identity.19 
A. Cyprus Leading Up to Partition 
 
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots20 have a lengthy and harried past of 
general disagreement that precedes World War I.21  Britain annexed 
Cyprus island in 1914, and the Turkish-Cypriots pledged their loyalty to 
the British during World War I.22 The Greek-Cypriots, however, were 
not as devoted to Britain as their Turkish counterparts, and the Greek-																																								 																					
16  History of Cyprus, HIGH COMM’N REP. CYPRUS CANBERRA, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/highcom/highcomcanberra.nsf/cyprus02_en/cyprus02_en?OpenDocume
nt (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20  Meaning a person from Cyprus. 
21 30. British Cyprus (1914–1960), UNIV. CENT. ARK., http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-
project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/british-cyprus-1914-1960/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) 
[hereinafter British Cyprus]. 
22 Id.  
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Cypriots formed an assembly in 1921 to demand enosis (unification with 
Greece).23 However, Britain declared Cyprus to be a British colony in 
1925 and in 1929 the British Colonial Secretary officially denied the 
Greek-Cypriots’ demands for unification with Greece in 1929.24  
After the Greek-Cypriots’ attempts, the Turkish-Cypriots, with 
objections of their own, tried to form their own National Congress in 
1931. 25  Predictably, the British Colonial Government refused to 
recognize the Congress.26 That same year, the Legislative Council’s 
Greek-Cypriot members resigned from their positions in protest after the 
British Colonial Government passed a tariff law. 27  The tariff law 
fomented yet another round of riots and unrest from the Greek-Cypriots, 
which the British again suppressed.28  
In 1950, a plebiscite was held, where ninety-six percent of the 
Greek-Cypriot population voted in favor of unification with Greece.29 In 
response, the British Colonial Government banned all protests and 
demonstrations. 30  Consequently, Greece brought the Cyprus matter 
before the United Nations (UN); however, the UN General Assembly 
replied that it was not “deemed advisable to make a decision on the 
question of Cyprus.”31 
In 1955, the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), 
who was not only anti-Britain, but also pro-unification with Greece, and 
is now known as a terrorist group, revolted against the British.32 The 
EOKA revolt ultimately culminated in the deportation of a leading 
advocate of enosis, the Greek-Cypriot Archbishop Makarios, for 
“actively fostering terrorism” and for supporting the creation of EOKA.33 
In 1960, after a four-year struggle between both Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriots vying for power, Cyprus was finally granted its independence.34  
Shortly after returning to Cyprus on March 1, 1959, Archbishop 
Makarios was elected President.35 He, along with Turkish-Cypriot Vice 
President Fazıl Küçük, attempted to form the government of the newly 																																								 																					
23 Id.   
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.   
27 Id.   
28 Id.   
29 Id.   
30 Id. 
31  Id. See also 1956: Britain deports Cyprus Archbishop, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/9/newsid_3745000/3745505.stm (last visited 
Sept 19, 2015). 
32 British Cyprus, supra note 21. See also 1956: Britain deports Cyprus Archbishop, supra 
note 31. 
33 Id. 
34  Modern History of Cyprus. EMBASSY REP. CYPRUS WASH. D.C., 
http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&pid=8 (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
35 British Cyprus, supra note 21. See also Markarios elected president of Cyprus, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/14/newsid_3747000/3747247.stm (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
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established country.36 The new Cypriot constitution mandated quotas of 
Turkish representatives in government.37 However, according to Greek-
Cypriots, the Turkish quotas exceeded the percentage of the Turkish 
population. 38  It was not long before Makarios proposed abolishing 
several passages of the constitution written to guarantee the rights and 
interests of Turkish-Cypriots, demonstrating the extensive differences 
that still existed between the two groups.39 As a result, the Turkish-
Cypriots rebelled and refused to report to their public service positions or 
attend to their seats in the Cabinet, and violence erupted between the two 
co-inhabitants of the island.40  An autonomous Cyprus, as an independent 
state that protected the rights of both its Greek and Turkish citizens, 
seemed to be a failed experiment. 
 
B. Cyprus v. Turkey: 1974 to the Primary Ruling 
 
In 1974, a coup, backed by the military junta in Athens, Greece, 
ousted Makarios based on concerns that he was “influenced by 
communism and [was] unwilling to commit to continued close ties with 
Athens.”41 Turkey deployed troops in response to this takeover under the 
premise of helping Turkish-Cypriots that were in “desperate need of 
protection,” and then took possession of thirty-seven percent of the 
northern part of the island.42 As a result, nearly all Greek-Cypriots 
(almost 200,000 people, or forty percent of the total Greek-Cypriot 
population) fled from that portion of Cyprus; and nearly all the Turkish-
Cypriots moved to the Turkish controlled territory.43 According to a 
conservative estimate, ninety percent of the Greek-Cypriots formerly 
living in the occupied area fled south or to British sovereign bases.44 
Some 13,000 Greek-Cypriot farmers remained in the remote Karpas 
peninsula located in the Turkish military zone.45 That number is said to 
have decreased over the years to less than 600 individuals.46 
Upon the eviction of the Greek-Cypriots and through the aid of 
Turkish national troops, a new government was established: the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).47 Turkey continues to control this 
																																								 																					
36 Paul Rowan & Stephen Armstrong, Cyprus and the European Union, PROGRAMS INT’L 
EDUC. RESOURCES, http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/pier/resources/lessons/cyprus_history.htm (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
37 ANDREW BOROWIEC, CYPRUS: A TROUBLED ISLAND 47 (2000). 
38 Id.   
39 Rowan & Armstrong, supra note 36. 
40 Id. See also Modern History of Cyprus, supra note 34. 
41 Rowan & Armstrong, supra note 36. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. See also Modern History of Cyprus, supra note 34. 
44 See BOROWIEC, supra note 37, at 97.  
45 Id. at 98.  
46 Id.   
47 Rowan & Armstrong, supra note 36. 
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portion of the island48 and is the only country to recognize the TRNC 
government.49 In fact, the UN Security Council and other international 
bodies condemned the TRNC government.50 Because the government of 
TRNC has not been recognized, the Court, in its 2001 judgment, held 
Turkey responsible for the various human rights violations that were 
committed, stating, “Having effective overall control over northern 
Cyprus, [Turkey’s] responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its 
own soldiers or officials . . . [b]ut must also be engaged by virtue of the 
acts of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish 
military and other support.”51 
In 2001, Turkey was found to have committed fourteen violations of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention).52 Most 
notably, the Court found that there had been a “continuing violation of 
Article 2 on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent 
State to conduct an effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate 
of Greek-Cypriot missing persons who disappeared in life-threatening 
circumstances.”53 The Court also found violations of Article 3 in relation 
to the Karpas peninsula’s enclaved Greek-Cypriots for condemning the 
inhabitants to live in conditions that were “debasing and [that] violate the 
very notion of respect for the human dignity of its members.”54 However, 
the Court unanimously held that it was not yet ready to make a decision 
about the “issue of the possible application of Article 41” at the time, so 
it “adjourned consideration” on the topic.55 
 
C. Cyprus v. Turkey: Just Satisfaction 
 
In 2010, nine years after the principal judgment, Cyprus submitted 
its claims for just satisfaction.56 The Court heard the application and 
passed a judgment in May 2014.57 Turkey raised three main arguments 
against applying just satisfaction in this case.58 First, Turkey claimed that 
too much time had passed since the principal judgment, and that Cyprus 
had had a duty, under international law, to bring the case as soon as 
																																								 																					
48 The Council of Europe and the Cyprus Question, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS IN 
WASHINGTON D.C. (last visited Sept 19, 2015) 
http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&pid=18. 
49  Modern History of Cyprus, supra note 34. 
50 Id. 
51  Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 18 (1995), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57920#{"itemid":["001-57920"]} (¶ 62). 
See also Cyprus v. Turkey (Principal Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20–21 (¶ 77). 
52 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Principal Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
53 Id. at 36 (¶ 136). 
54 Id. at 74 (¶ 309). 
55 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (¶ 4). 
56 Id. (¶ 6).  
57 See id. 
58 See id.  
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possible.59 Second, Turkey asserted that the Court should not apply 
Article 41 to inter-State cases because just satisfaction should only be 
applied to individuals. 60  Lastly, Turkey argued that the Court had 
discretion in dispensing judgments and that the initial judgment thirteen 
years earlier was punishment enough.61   
Addressing the first point, Turkey argued that this latest filing should 
not be permitted because it would be time-barred to individual 
applicants, and the thirteen-year gap between the judgment on the merits 
and this renewed application was far too long.62 The Court held that 
while the rules for a timely filing for just satisfaction had since changed 
and would have precluded Cyprus from filing,63 the changes did not 
apply in this particular case because of the special circumstances 
surrounding it.64 Namely, the Court advised Cyprus, in a letter sent to 
both governments, not to apply for just satisfaction in 2001 when the 
Court was deciding the case on the merits.65 In addition, the Court’s 
initial judgment set aside claims for just satisfaction, and did not 
preclude Cyprus from ever coming before the Court again.66 The Court 
also noted that Cyprus did not expressly say it would never apply for just 
satisfaction, so there was no reason for Turkey to believe that Cyprus 
would not.67 
As to the second point, the Cypriot government initially asked for 
€12,000 to be allocated to each of the surviving relatives of each of the 
1,456 missing persons, but later raised the amount to €20,000 per 
individual.68 It also asked for €50,000 for each Greek-Cypriot resident of 
the Karpas peninsula.69 The fact that Cyprus did not attempt to identify 
the number of potential beneficiaries Turkey claimed from the Karpas 
peninsula70 did not seem to sway the Court from offering reparations. 
This was one of Turkish Judge Karakaᶊ’ strongest complaints in his 
dissenting opinion, especially since the Court belabored the idea that just 
satisfaction was pertinent to inter-State cases only because the money 
was to be given to the individuals and not to the State; yet, these 
individuals were not identified.71 																																								 																					
59 Id. at 5–6 (¶¶ 18–19). 
60 Id. at 13 (¶ 38). 
61 Id. at 18 (¶ 55). 
62 Id. at 5–7 (¶¶ 18, 22).  
63 See id. at 8 (¶ 25).   
64 Id. at 8–9 (¶ 26). (“In the principal judgment the issue of a possible award of just satisfaction 
was adjourned, which clearly and unambiguously meant that the Court had not excluded the 
possibility of resuming the examination of this issue at some appropriate point in the future. Neither 
of the parties could therefore reasonably expect that this matter would be left unaddressed, or that it 
would be extinguished or nullified by the passage of time.”). 
65 Id. at 2 (¶ 3).  
66 Id. at 8–9 (¶ 26). 
67 Id. at 5 (¶ 15). 
68 Id. at 16 (¶ 49). 
69 Id. at 17 (¶ 53). 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 55 (Karakaᶊ, J., dissenting). 
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Along with the UN Committee of Missing Persons, Turkey argued 
that it had progressed since the initial judgment and many of the missing 
persons had been found, thereby turning the “missing persons” issue into 
a “dead persons” issue, bringing to light a whole new set of procedural 
obligations and time limits.72 Although Turkey argued that the Court had 
acknowledged their “considerable progress in locating and identifying 
the victims’ remains,”73 various third parties seem to disagree. Several 
non-profits have written to the Committee of Ministers (the body 
overseeing Turkey’s compliance with the principal judgment) to 
complain about Turkey’s lack of compliance with former judgments and 
to advocate for the Committee of Ministers to do more to force Turkey 
into compliance.74  
Finally, as to the last point, Turkey argued that the Court had 
discretion in offering punitive damages, and in light of the improvements 
to living conditions in Karpas made in the years since the initial 
judgment, the Court should have “decide[d] that the finding of a 
violation in the judgment on the merits offers a sufficient satisfaction.”75 
The dissenting opinion of Judge Karakaᶊ discusses the reasoning behind 
this argument by referencing the Corfu Channel case where, “by reason 
of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters in the course of the 
Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the United Kingdom 
violated the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of Albania, and that 
this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate 																																								 																					
72 Id. at 6–7 (¶ 21). 
73 Id. See also Charalambous and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2012), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110459#{"itemid":["001-110459"]}. 
74 See Letter from Organisation of Relatives of Missing Cypriots (UK) to Director General, 
Directorate General for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Secretariat of the Council of Europe 
(Nov. 12, 2013), available at  
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetIma
ge=2415508&SecMode=1&DocId=2090616&Usage=2 (“It is only with Turkey’s co-operation that 
our problem will finally be resolved. We feel extremely aggrieved that successive Turkish 
Governments have never shown the goodwill necessary to provide the solution to this long standing 
humanitarian issue. . . . The case of our Missing is the longest standing unresolved issue before the 
ECHR and the Committee, and how it is managed and resolved will set a precedent for current and 
future cases. The upholding of justice and human rights rest on the shoulders of these institutions.”). 
See Letter from Ashia Community Council to Mr. Philippe Boillat, Director General of Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law, Department for the Execution of Judgments of the ECHR, Council of 
Europe (Nov. 29, 2013), available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetI 
mage=2415496&SecMode=1&DocId=2090582&Usage=2 (complaining that the sites of mass 
graves that the CMP were given to examine and identify the missing had previously been excavated 
with evidence that “[t]he exhumation and disappearance of the remains of these individuals clearly 
intended to erase the evidence of a war crime;” the Council called for the investigation into what 
happened to these people to continue). See Letter from Organisation of relatives of undeclared 
prisoners and missing persons of Cyprus to Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetIma
ge=2242750&SecMode=1&DocId=1988110&Usage=2 (requesting that that Committee pressure 
Turkey into allowing them to dig up their father’s remains which are a short distance from where a 
piece of his skull had been allegedly moved into a mass grave to halt the investigations). 
75 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18 (¶¶ 54–55). 
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satisfaction.”76 Judge Karakaᶊ went on to cite two other cases, one as 
recent as 2000, each of which similarly concluded that the Court has 
discretion to decide if the just satisfaction is sufficient.77 
However, the Court clearly did not find this argument persuasive. 
Whether or not the Court took Turkey’s supposed progress and past 
judgments into account during its just compensation analysis is 
unknown. Regardless of the weight given to past judgments, the Court 
reiterated its general statement in the Varnava v. Others judgment, 
saying, “non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that 
moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human 
right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage.”78  
Ultimately, the Court awarded the Cypriot Government “aggregate 
sums of €30,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage suffered by the 
surviving relatives of the missing persons, and €60,000,000 for non-
pecuniary damage suffered by the enclaved residents of Karpas 
peninsula.”79 The Cypriot Government was given the task of divvying 
the reward to the individuals the judgment recognized.80 
Following a judgment, it is every Member State’s responsibility to 
comply with judgments by making restitution, usually in the form of 
legislation reform, to ensure that the human rights violation will not 
continue.81 The Court may also grant just satisfaction in the form of 
monetary compensation if the applicant State has received damage.82 It is 
then the Committee of Minister’s responsibility to see that the sum is 
collected.83 
 
D. The Duty of Restitution/Reparation in Human Rights Cases 
 
Perhaps the most pertinent article in the Convention to the current 
judgment is Article 46, which reads, “[t]he High Contracting Parties 
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to 
which they are parties.”84 This agreement portrays the demand that each 
State comply with all judgments laid against them. Turkey, and every 
other Contracting Party to the Convention, has thus implicitly agreed to 
obey the edicts of the Court. In the words of the Court:  
 
Under Article 46, the State Party is under an obligation 
not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by the 
Court by way of just satisfaction, but also to take 																																								 																					
76 Id. at 53 (Karakaᶊ, J., dissenting).  
77 Id. at 53–54 (Karakaᶊ, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 18 (¶ 56). 
79 Id. at 19 (¶ 58).  
80 Id. at 21 (¶ 5(c)). 
81  The ECHR in 50 Questions, EUR. CT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (¶ 41). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (¶ 42). 
84 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (¶ 11). 
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individual or, if appropriate, general measures in its 
domestic legal order, or both, to put an end to the 
violation found by the Court and to redress the effects, 
the aim being to put the applicant, as far as possible, in 
the position he would have been in had the requirements 
of the Convention not been disregarded.85 
 
As the Court noted, it is widely accepted under international law that 
States have an obligation to not only cease and desist from performing 
whatever wrongful act they are committing, 86  but also to offer 
reparations as a remedy for the wrong that was done.87 In 2001, the 
International Law Commission codified these norms in the Articles of 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles of 
Responsibility).88 Article 30 of the Articles of Responsibility affirms that 
the State that perpetrated the wrongdoing has an obligation “(a) to cease 
that act, if it is continuing;” and “(b) to offer appropriate assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.” 89  This 
obligation exists separately from the obligation to make reparations as 
declared in Article 31, which states, “The responsible State is under an 
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act.”90  
This idea of being obligated to pay reparations predates the Articles 
of Responsibility and goes as far back as the Factory of Chorzów case 
brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 
1927. 91  “The PCIJ added that reparation ‘is the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no need for 
this to be stated in the convention itself.’”92 Subsequently, various courts, 
including the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have acknowledged the 
concept. 93  Likewise, the Court in the present just satisfaction case 
followed this reasoning when responding to Turkey’s argument that the 
initial ruling on the merits was enough punishment. 
																																								 																					
85 Id. at 9–10 (¶ 27).  
86 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available 
at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Article 30: “The 
State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it 
is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances 
so require.”). 
87 Antoine Buyse, Lost and Regained? Restitution as a Remedy for Human Rights Violations in 
the Context of International Law, 68 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (2008).  
88 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 86 
(art. 30). 
89 Id. (art. 30).  
90 Id. (art. 31). 
91 Buyse, supra note 87, at 130. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  
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Having received the judgment in 2001, Turkey would be responsible 
for making reparations based on general international law alone. 
However, it is subject to an even stronger compulsion. Turkey ratified 
the Convention in 1954 and subsequently accepted the right to apply to 
the Court individually in 1987.94 Just three short years later, Turkey 
chose to accept the decisions of the Court and pay any potential fines 
imposed on it in judgments.95 In 1993, Turkey brought its first individual 
application before the Court, and the Court made its first decisions on 
Turkey in 1995.96 Therefore, Turkey is not only subject to general 
international law, but also to the rules laid out in the Convention. 
The Convention97 has several articles that pertain to remedies.98 
However, the Court’s ability to order restitution comes from Article 41.99 
“The Court analogizes Article 41 of the Convention to the principle of 
reparations in public international law.100 The Court also proclaims that 
the power of an international court or tribunal “which has jurisdiction 
with the respect to a claim of State responsibility,” and “has, as an aspect 
of that jurisdiction, the power to award compensation for damage 
suffered.”101 
After declaring such an order, Article 46 of the Convention instructs 
that, “[t]he final judgment of the Court shall [then] be transmitted to the 
Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.” 102 
Therefore, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is in 
charge of supervising the Grand Chamber of the Court’s finalized 
execution of judgments.103   
 
III. THE EXPANDING POWERS OF THE COURT 
 
The analysis laid out in the concurring opinions accompanying the 
judgment makes it clear that the Court is using the just satisfaction 
judgment as a launching board to afford itself more power in levying 
punitive punishments against noncompliant Contracting Parties. One 
concurring opinion, in which multiple judges agreed with, declared this 
judgment as heralding “a new era in the enforcement of human rights 
upheld by the Court and mark[ing] an important step in ensuring respect 
																																								 																					
94 JITEM’s illegal actions cost Turkey a fortune, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Aug. 27, 2008, 8:36 PM), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/national_jitems-illegal-actions-cost-turkey-a-fortune_151355.html. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Convention, supra note 6, at art. 41. 
98 See generally id. at arts. 13, 41. (for example, Article 13 provides for an “effective remedy 
before a national authority”). 
99 Convention, supra note 6. 
100 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13–14 (¶ 41). 
101 Id.   
102 Id. at 3 (¶ 11).  
103 Supervision of execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, COUNCIL 
EUR., http://www.coe.int/T/CM/humanRights_en.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
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for the rule of law in Europe.”104 Another concurring opinion indicated 
this was 
 
the most important contribution to peace in Europe in 
the history of the European Court of Human Rights . . . . 
The Court has not only acknowledged the applicability 
of Article 41 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights . . . to inter-State applications and established 
criteria for the assessment of the time-limit for these just 
satisfaction claims, but has awarded punitive damages to 
the claimant State.105 
 
In light of the “historical importance of this judgment,”106 this Part 
will expound upon (a) the importance of establishing customary law in 
inter-State cases and in the application of punitive damages; (b) the 
application of a Court-created time limit for the payment of the claims; 
and (c) possible applications of this newfound power.     
 
A. Establishing Customary Law in Favor of Inter-State Cases 
 
The Convention distinguishes between two types of applications that 
can be brought before the Court: “individual applications lodged by any 
person, group of individuals, company or NGO having a complaint about 
a violation of their rights, and inter-State applications brought by one 
State against another.”107 Individuals present most applications brought 
before the Court.108 In fact, Greek-Cypriots brought several individual 
cases against Turkey pertaining to the same set of facts.109 Although 
inter-State cases are rare,110 the current judgment for just satisfaction 
hails from an inter-State application. 
Article 33 of the Convention allows the Court to hear inter-State 
cases.111 It reads: “Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court 
any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto by another High Contracting Party.”112 This is a very broad 
standard. Despite Turkey’s continual assertions to the contrary, Cyprus, 
or any other State for that matter, can refer even an alleged breach of the 
Convention to the Court. A State may hold another State responsible for 																																								 																					
104  Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23 (Zupančič, Gyulumyan, 
Björgvinsson, Nicolaou, Sajó, Trajkovska, Power-Forde, Vučinić and Albuquerque, J., joint 
concurring).  
105 Id. at 24 (Albuquerque, J., concurring).  
106 Id.  
107 The ECHR in 50 Questions, supra note 81, at 6 (¶ 19).  
108 Id. 
109 See Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
110 The ECHR in 50 Questions, supra note 81, at 6 (¶ 19). 
111 Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33. 
112 Id. 
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any violation of the Convention, including military regime violations, as 
was demonstrated in the case of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands v. Greece in 1967–68.113    
While inter-State cases have come before the Court in the past, this is 
the first instance where the Court used the just satisfaction judgment to 
levy punishment. However, the Cypriot Government argued that the 
Court previously implied that Article 41 applied to inter-State cases by 
mentioning in a previous case that it was “not necessary to apply it,” 
rather than dismissing the potential Article 41 judgment.114  
 In response, Turkey referred to Varnava and Others v. Turkey, 
where the Court used just satisfaction to allow individual applicants to 
bring separate claims, despite the fact that an inter-State case was already 
judged upon the same set of facts; this reasoning took precedence over 
general international law.115  In this 2009 Varnava and Others case, 
Turkey objected to the individual applications because the inter-State 
application had already had a judgment made and used the same set of 
facts.116 However, the Court replied that the judgment “did not specify in 
respect [to] which individual missing persons [the judgments] were made 
(see Cyprus v. Turkey, . . . where the evidence was found to bear out the 
assertion that ‘many persons now missing’ had been detained by the 
respondent Government or forces for which they were responsible).”117 
Therefore, the judgment cannot be regarded as determinative in the 
individuals’ applications. Additionally, the Court determined that it had 
“the competence to issue just satisfaction awards for pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damage suffered by individual applicants and to give 
indications under Article 46 as to any general or individual measures that 
might be taken.”118  Therefore, the individual applicants’ applications 
could result in different issues or outcomes than those that arose in the 
inter-State case, and the Court could examine those applicants’ 
applications.119 
While the Court did not expressly say that just satisfaction could 
only be brought in individual cases, Turkey’s interpretation of the 
Court’s decision seemed sound. The Court listed ways that the individual 
applications differed from the already decided State application and 																																								 																					
113  Isabella Risini, Can’t get no just satisfaction? The Cyprus v. Turkey judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. (May 23, 2014), 
http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/05/23/cant-get-just-satisfaction-cyprus-v-turkey-judgment-european-court-
human-rights/.  
114  Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 11 (2014), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-144151#{"itemid":["001-144151"]} (¶ 
33), arguing that in Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57506#{"itemid":["001-57506"]}, the 
Court asked the applicant if it would like the Court to consider just satisfaction, but Ireland declined 
the invitation. 
115 Cyprus v. Turkey, (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20 (¶ 23).  
116 Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Eut. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 118–19.  
117 Id. 
118 Id. (emphasis added). 
119 Id. ¶ 119.  
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expressly noted that individual applicants could bring just satisfaction 
claims.120  
The Court countered Turkey’s argument by asserting, “the provisions 
of the Convention cannot be applied and interpreted in a vacuum.”121 The 
Court went on to say, “Despite its specific character as a human rights 
instrument, the Convention is an international treaty to be interpreted in 
accordance with the relevant norms and principles of public international 
law.”122  
The Court also noted that Article 41 is lex specialis to general 
international law,123 but still chose a broad interpretation of Article 41 
that mirrors that of general international law. The Court explained that 
while Article 41 would be allowed in inter-State cases, the conveyance of 
an award by the Court would be decided on a case-by-case basis 
depending on the type of complaint offered.124 Also, the award would 
only be granted if the actual victims of the harm and recipients of the 
award were individuals themselves.125 The Court stated:  
 
[I]t must be always kept in mind that, according to the 
very nature of the Convention, it is the individual, and 
not the State, who is directly or indirectly harmed and 
primarily “injured” by a violation of one or several 
Convention rights. Therefore, if just satisfaction is 
afforded in an inter-State case, it should always be done 
for the benefit of individual victims.126  
 
This means that general complaints brought under Article 33 about 
systemic issues or administrative practices will not warrant compensation 
under Article 41, as the main goal of those cases is that of “vindicating 
the public order of Europe within the framework of collective 
responsibility under the Convention.”127 
According to the dissenting opinion of Judge Karakaᶊ and the partly 
concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Casadevall, this is 
contradictory. Using vivid language, Judge Karakaᶊ argued: 
 
According to the principles of public international law 
on reparation for non-pecuniary damage in cases not 
concerning diplomatic protection, the violation found in 
the judgment on the merits should constitute sufficient 																																								 																					
120 See Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Eut. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 119.  
121 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (¶ 23).  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 14 (¶ 42). 
124 Id. See also Risini, supra note 113. 
125 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20 (¶¶ 46–47). 
126 Id. (¶ 46).  
127 Id. (¶¶ 43–44). 
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just satisfaction, without it being necessary to award 
aggregate, not to say speculative, sums such as those 
claimed by the Cypriot Government in respect of “non-
pecuniary damage” on behalf of a vague and 
unidentifiable number of persons purported to be still 
alive.128 
 
Judge Karakas argued that this case was not one with identifiable 
individuals that the Court described in its judgment.129 Judge Casadevall 
agrees with this sentiment in part. He voted in favor of awarding just 
satisfaction to the identified 1,456 missing persons, but rejected applying 
just satisfaction to the residents of the Karpas peninsula “who [were] 
defined in an abstract manner . . . [as] individuals who ha[d] to be 
identified and listed ex post facto eleven years after the delivery of the 
judgment on the merits.”130 He went on to say:  
 
If numerous difficulties are likely to be encountered in 
providing compensation (within eighteen months) to the 
heirs of the 1,456 missing persons, I dread to think of the 
complications that are bound to arise in identifying and 
listing the thousands of displaced persons. Supervising 
the execution of this judgment will be no easy task.131 
 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Albuquerque acknowledged that 
there was no certainty that the payments will reach the actual victims in 
the Karpas peninsula, and he uses that fact, among others, to illustrate 
that the “punitive nature of this compensation is flagrant.”132   
Judge Albuquerque put into plain terms his view of the award given 
to Cyprus.133 He heralded the fact that punitive damages are a tool for 
upholding human rights and ensuring the “observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties.”134 He maintained 
that the use of punitive damages was especially prudent in this case 
because Turkey committed a myriad of human rights violations “over a 
significant period of time in Northern Cyprus,”135 did not investigate 																																								 																					
128 Id. at 53 (Krakaᶊ, J., dissenting). 
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 46 (Casadevall, J., partly concurring and partly dissenting).  
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 31 (¶ 13) (Albuquerque, J., concurring). 
133 Id. (Albuquerque, J., concurring) (“In spite of the fact that the identity of the victims of the 
respondent State’s actions and omissions and the ensuing massive and gross human rights violations 
committed in the Karpas enclave could not be established, that the missing persons claims would 
have been time-barred if lodged individually by their respective families and that there can be no 
certainty that the indemnities obtained will devolve on the individuals concerned, the Court punished 
the respondent State for its unlawful actions and omissions and their harmful consequences. There is 
nothing new about this procedure.”). 
134 Id. at 37 (¶ 19) (Albuquerque, J., concurring). 
135 Id.  
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these violations “adequately and in a timely manner,” 136  and 
“deliberately failed year after year to comply with the Grand Chamber’s 
judgment on the merits delivered a long time ago with regard to these 
specific violations.”137 
The door to awarding just satisfaction in inter-State applications has 
been opened, and, read in conjunction with the concurring opinions, it 
appears that just satisfaction has been used as a means to punish Turkey 
for its lack of compliance with the Convention and past judgments. In 
spite of Turkey’s objections, just satisfaction can now be applied even 
though the harmed individuals have not been expressly identified.  
 
B. Possible Applications of this Newfound Power 
 
In light of the €90,000,000 judgment meted out, and of the 
explanations for that judgment laid out in Judge Albuquerque’s 
concurring opinion, one can easily see that the Court hoped to use the 
punitive nature of the award to keep errant nations that violate human 
rights from becoming complacent with paying money alone as 
compensation for their actions. This Part gives an example of how just 
satisfaction may have a bearing on the recent occupations carried out by 
Russia. 
The Court’s ruling came at an inconvenient time for the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots who had just resumed peace talks after a two-year 
hiatus.138 One must assume that the Court had a very good reason for 
potentially undermining an attempt at peace. It did not escape anyone’s 
attention that this forthright ruling immediately followed Crimea’s 
amalgamation into Russia. Based on the pointed remarks of the 
concurring opinions, it is highly likely that the Court plans on taking a 
more active role in policing any European aggressor.  
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque severely admonished in his concurring 
opinion:  
 
The message to member States of the Council of Europe 
is clear: those member States that wage war, invade or 
support foreign armed intervention in other member 
States must pay for their unlawful actions and the 
consequences of their actions, and the victims, their 
families and the States of their nationality have a vested 
and enforceable right to be duly and fully compensated 
by the responsible warring State. War and its tragic 
consequences are no longer tolerable in Europe and 
those member States that do not comply with this 																																								 																					
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 See Christie-Miller, supra note 14. 
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principle must be made judicially accountable for their 
actions, without prejudice to additional political 
consequences.139 
 
While this is an aggressive statement toward any warmongering 
State, it came just months after Ukraine filed an application against 
Russia before the European Court of Human Rights.140 The timing of this 
decision did not go unnoticed; one cannot help but wonder if this 
judgment came in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea that took 
place just two months prior to the pronouncement of this judgment.141 
Was this judgment a direct response to current events? The question 
of jurisdiction was an existing obstacle for holding States that practiced 
armed intervention responsible before the European Court of Human 
Rights for their intrusion and subsequent human rights violation. The 
Russia-Crimea fact pattern somewhat mirrors that of the Turkey-Cyprus 
situation. Turkey invaded Cyprus and took hold of thirty-seven percent 
of the island to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots there.142 
Although a separate government (the TRNC) was established, it was not 
recognized by any other State; thus, in the eyes of international law, 
Cyprus has only one government.143 Through the laws of secession, 
Russia claimed that Crimea was an independent state and that Russian 
citizens needed Russia to help protect their interests.144 Like Turkey’s 
sole recognition of the TRNC, Russia was the only State to recognize 
Crimea as an independent State before absorbing it.145 Since Crimea’s 
secession was not recognized by any other State, its absorption into 
Russia was achieved by a use of force, and therefore, no other State 
recognized the change in territory to Ukraine.146 Some British legal 
scholars summarized this position succinctly: 
 
A state in occupation of the territory of another state, 
even following a lawful armed conflict, has no right to 
annex that territory. Therefore, even if, hypothetically, 
one were to entertain the multiple justifications put 																																								 																					
139  Cyprus v. Turkey, (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20 (¶ 1) (Albuquerque, J., 
concurring). 
140  Thomas D. Grant, Crimea after Cyprus v. Turkey: Just Satisfaction for Unlawful 
Annexation?, BLOG EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (May 19, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-after-cyprus-
v-turkey-just-satisfaction-for-unlawful-annexation/. 
141 Id. See also Anthony Lott, Cyprus v. Turkey: Just Satisfaction and Added Aggression, 18 
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 18 (Aug. 27, 2014) available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/18/cyprus-v-turkey-just-satisfaction-and-acts-
aggression. 
142 See History of Cyprus, supra note 16. 
143 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Principal Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5 (¶ 14). 
144 Dr. Roy Allison, et al., The Ukraine Crisis: An International Law Perspective, CHATHAM 
HOUSE: THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (July 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140711UkraineLaw
_0.pdf. 
145 Id. 
146 See id.  
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forward by Russia as to why the intervention into 
Ukraine might have been lawful, the international 
community would still be obliged not to recognize the 
changes to the territorial boundaries of Ukraine.147 
 
If the international community has not recognized Crimea as being 
under Russian jurisdiction, how will the Court hold Russia responsible 
for human rights violations taking place in what it perceives as the 
territory of Ukraine? The principal judgment in Cyprus v. Turkey held 
Turkey liable for human rights violations taking place in Northern 
Cyprus without acknowledging that it actually annexed Northern Cyprus. 
Thus, that judgment could be applied in this situation where Russia has 
forcefully annexed Crimea.148 A senior research fellow writing for the 
European Journal of International Law alleges:  
 
This holding indeed is significant to Ukraine, as it makes 
clear that non-recognition is not inconsistent with 
applying the rules and procedures of the Convention 
against the State which purports to have effected the 
change of boundaries by force. Applied to Crimea, the 
Russian Federation is answerable under the Convention 
for its conduct in that territory, and to hold Russia 
answerable does nothing to qualify or erode the general 
non-recognition of the unlawful annexation.149 
 
Regardless of whether the international community recognizes the 
territory shift, the Cyprus judgment allows for the punishment of warring 
States. It may be too soon to identify the exact violations of the 
Convention that have been committed by Russia during its invasion of 
Crimea. However, the initial indications are distressing, as demonstrated 
by the fact that the Court has already issued interim measures to Russia 
in relation to Articles 2 and 3, under Rule 39.150  
Clearly the passage of time—forty years—from the initial situation 
in Cyprus that gave rise to the claims did not serve to deter the Court 
from deciding the Cyprus just satisfaction claim. Philippe Sands, a law 
professor from the University College London said in an interview with 
The Guardian, “It’s a strong signal that the passage of time will not 
diminish the consequences or costs of illegal occupation.”151 This begs 
the question: Is Russia, or any other country that performs armed 																																								 																					
147 Id.  
148 Grant, supra note 140. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Julian Borger, European Court Orders Turkey to Pay Damages for Cyprus Invasion, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/may/12/european-court-human-
rights-turkey-compensation-cyprus-invasion. 
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intervention in another State, opening itself up to just satisfaction claims 
indefinitely? Judge Albuquerque, in his concurring opinion, alluded to 
the fact that they just might, when he observed that “international law in 
general did not at that time, and still does not today, set a specific time-
limit for just satisfaction claims.”152 It appears that the just satisfaction 
ruling is the Court’s way of showing that the passage of time (more than 
forty years in this case) does not preclude the Court from meting out 
harsh remedies.  
The Court’s forceful statement was clear, at least in theory. But, has 
the Court overstepped its bounds? Will it be taken seriously? Can it be 
trusted to be a neutral intermediary between States? Some believe that 
the aggressive stance taken by the Court, namely openly stating that the 
just satisfaction award is a punishment, will likely not achieve the goal of 
correcting Turkey’s unsatisfactory behavior and may even be 
counterproductive.153   
Isabella Risini, in an article posted in the Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, cautioned the Court to remember 
that “the success of the Convention, is, as it was sixty years ago, 
inherently depended on the cooperation of states.” She goes on to say,   
 
The objectivity and neutrality of the Court will be 
essential if it wants to be taken seriously as an arbiter in 
cases such as the one between Russia and Ukraine, 
especially when it asks for respect for interim 
measures in inter-state proceedings without being able to 
rely on a clear legal foundation.154 
 
The Court may continue to exact harsh punishments that create 
precedent for future cases, but if the Contracting Parties do not cooperate 
with the Court, the Court may lose its credibility.   
The Court has had much greater success in getting nations that 
violate the Convention to pay fines than in getting them to enact 
legislation to fix the problem.155 This is certainly the case, as Cyprus has 
complained, in the case of missing persons.156 In an article published by 
the Chatham House, various legal scholars note:   
 
The ECHR is experienced in dealing with cases of 
forced disappearances. However, it may be said that the 
court has yet to show progress in ordering a state to 
carry out effective investigations which would offer, in 
part, redress to victims. The dissenting and concurring 																																								 																					
152 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27 (¶ 7) (Albuquerque, J., concurring).  
153 Risini, supra note 113. 
154 Id. 
155 See Allison, supra note 144, at 5. 
156 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20. 
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opinions in Medova v. Russia and Varnava v. Turkey 
raise this point.157  
It is the Court’s job to make decisions on the merits of a case, but it 
has always been the Committee of Minister’s job to monitor “the 
execution of judgments, particularly to ensure payment of the amounts 
awarded by the Court to the applicants in compensation for the damage 
they have sustained.”158 The Court seems to be taking a more active role 
in deciding how they want the case to be taken care of. The Court 
demonstrated its activism by issuing a timeline (three months) for Turkey 
to make the payments to Cyprus.159 Some judges showed concern about 
the Court’s apparent overstepping of its role.160 Cyprus asked for a 
declaratory judgment to be made against Turkey for Turkey’s lack of 
response to the initial judgment.161 The Court granted the declaratory 
judgment but rightfully responded that it was the Committee of 
Minister’s job to “ensure that this holding which is binding in accordance 
with the Convention, and which has not yet been complied with, is given 
full effect by the respondent Government.”162 
The Court, however, did not stop there. Joined by Judge Krakaᶊ, four 
judges concurred in part in the judgment claiming that the final sentence 
of Paragraph 63163 made by the Court “extend[s] the powers of the Court 
and runs counter to Article 46 § 2 of the Convention by encroaching on 
the powers of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, to 
which the Convention has entrusted the task of supervising execution of 
the Court’s judgments.”164 
The four judges said that the “Court does not have jurisdiction to 
verify whether a Contracting Party has complied with the obligations 
imposed on it by one of the Court’s judgments.”165 By allowing Cyprus 
to circumvent the Committee of Ministers and refer a matter to the Court, 
the Court has potentially created an “imbalance in the distribution of 
powers between the two institutions that was envisaged by the authors of 
the Convention.”166  
																																								 																					
157 See Allison, supra note 144. 
158 The ECHR in 50 Questions, supra note 81, at 9 (¶ 38).  
159 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20, (¶ 4(b)).  
160 See id.  (Tulkens, Vajić, Raimondi, and Bianku, joined by Karakaᶊ, J., partly concurring).  
161 Id. at 19 (¶ 61).  
162 Id. at 2 (¶ 63). 
163 Id. (“Furthermore the Court’s decision in the case of Demopoulos and Others, cited above, 
to the effect that cases presented by individuals concerning violation of property complaints were to 
be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, cannot be considered, on its own, to dispose of 
the question of Turkey’s compliance with section III of the operative provisions of the principal 
judgment in the inter-State case.”). 
164 Id. at 27 (¶ 6) (Tulkens, Vajić, Raimondi, and Bianku, joined by Karakaᶊ, J., partly 
concurring). 
165 Id. (¶ 7). 
166 Id. at 28 (¶ 9). 
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 In his concurring opinion, Judge Albuquerque hailed the Court’s 
right to make this declaratory judgment despite the fact that the 
application was decided in 2001 and the foreseeing of the execution of 
the judgment passed to the Committee of Ministers.167 He particularly 
relied on Article 41.168 He then distinguished the difference between the 
duty that a Member State has to prevent and abstain from violations of 
the Convention, and the fine of compensation that is put forth as a 
remedy.169 He maintained:  
Were it otherwise, the European human rights protection 
system would be flawed, because States could commit 
violations with impunity so long as they provided 
compensation to the victims of the violations after 
having committed unlawful acts. As the Commission 
stated in a number of cases, “the State [cannot] escape 
from its obligations merely by paying compensation.”170 
Assuming that the Court did infringe on the Committee of Minister’s 
duties by granting a declaration, and that the awarding of just satisfaction 
claims is a punitive weapon that the Court plans to arm itself with for 
future use, what are the implications? One could argue that the ultimate 
goal of the Convention is to keep Contracting Parties from committing 
human rights violations and then to give those who have been victimized 
a course of redress. In a situation where the Court finds that a violation 
of the Convention has taken place, the pressure (as stated in Article 30 of 
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (2001))171 is for cessation of the act causing the harm and 
for assurance that legislation will be enacted so it will not happen again.  
The Court is unlikely to forgive Member States who have not 
enacted the general measures necessary to rectify the violations 
committed and to prevent such violations from recurring.  Furthermore, 
the Court will not forget those Member States who choose not to comply, 
																																								 																					
167 Id. at 38 (¶ 21) (Albuquerque, J., concurring). 
168 See id. (“As a matter of principle, any State entitled to invoke responsibility may claim from 
the responsible State the cessation of the internationally wrongful act. Thus, the claimant State may 
request, under Article 41 of the Convention, a declaratory judgment stating that an ongoing violation 
must cease, especially but not exclusively when the ongoing violation of human rights infringes 
judgments of the Court which are already res judicata. Just satisfaction is then provided by way of 
appropriate declaratory relief to clarify the effects of the Court’s judgments in the light of a 
continuing unlawful practice.”). 
169 See id.  
170 Id.  
171  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 86, 
at 43 (Article 30: “The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: 
(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition, if circumstances so require.”). 
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as just satisfaction claims are not time-barred and the Court has a long 
memory.  
 
IV. TURKEY’S RESPONSE TO THE JUDGMENT 
 
Turkey is likely reeling from this groundbreaking decision. Turkey’s 
response to the judgment has the potential to profoundly impact its 
foreign relations with respect to its newly resumed peace talks with 
Cyprus and to its application to join the European Union. Because of this 
largely unresolved conflict between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, 
representatives of both factions are intermittently involved in 
negotiations to reach an amicable solution.172 The attitude that Turkey 
adopts towards the just satisfaction judgment will strongly affect how its 
efforts at meeting a resolution are perceived. Turkey is also currently 
expressing interest in joining the European Union. Turkey’s behavior 
toward its responsibility and commitment to its current membership in 
the European Court of Human Rights rulings can have a large impact on 
whether the European Union perceives Turkey as a suitable candidate.173 
The outstanding question, however, is whether or not Turkey’s response 
to the judgment diminishes the impact that the Court was trying to create. 
 
A. Turkey’s Intent to Ignore the Ruling 
 
Where Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a 
legitimate governmental entity and instead it recognizes the TRNC as the 
legitimate government, Turkey has argued throughout all cases brought 
by Cyprus before the European Court of Human Rights in relation to this 
incident that Cyprus does not have standing to refer claims to the 
Court.174 
Following the judgment, various news agencies quoted the Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu as saying, “In terms of the grounds 
of this ruling, its methods and the fact that it is considering a country that 
Turkey does not recognise as a counterpart, we don’t see it as binding 
and we see no need to make the payment.”175 Davutoglu went on to argue 
that not only had the Court exceeded its authority, but also that the 
timing of the decision was “meaningful” and “unfortunate.” 176  The 
Turkish and Cypriot governments had just commenced much anticipated 																																								 																					
172 Ceren Mutuş Toprakseven, The analysis of Cyprus v. Turkey Just Satisfaction Judgment and 
its Implications, TURKISH WKLY (May 22, 2014), http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/3190/the-
analysis-of-cyprus-v-turkey-just-satisfaction-judgment-and-its-implications.html. 
173 See Christie-Miller, supra note 14. 
174 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20. 
175 Toprakseven, supra note 172. See also Christie-Miller, supra note 14. 
176 Toprakseven, supra note 172. 
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negotiations about how to peacefully settle this long-standing conflict 
and now Turkey fears that this will give the Cypriot government undue 
leverage in the negotiations that may bring to a halt any progress that 
may have been made.177 
Turkey’s blatant denial of any need to pay the just satisfaction seems 
rather daring. Turkey has paid damages in the past,178 but has a history of 
only partial compliance with judgments coming from the Court. 179 
However, it would be surprising for Turkey to fully dismiss the ruling, as 
States rarely completely ignore a ruling but can be prone to partial 
compliance.180 
 
B. Potential Consequences of not Following the Ruling 
 
While some would argue that there are no realistic consequences for 
not complying with the judgments handed down by the Grand Chamber 
(as there has been an epidemic of States only partially complying with 
judgments),181 the Court gave Turkey a time limit of three months to pay 
Cyprus the €90,000,000.182 If Turkey did not pay, it would be charged 
interest.183 Upon further insubordination “legal experts said the country 
could theoretically have non-sovereign, commercial assets abroad seized 
to pay the damages.”184 When discussing the ramifications for Turkey’s 
refusal to abide by the ruling, reporter Ceren Mutus Toprakseven of the 
Turkish Weekly, reported: 
 
[T]here is now an ECHR decision which is undisputedly 
binding on Turkey under international law . . . . If 
Turkey resists paying the compensation within the three 
months allotted, interest will be added to the amount at 
first. Further rejection of payment may result in the 
Committee of Ministers’ placement of consistent 
pressure on Turkey through the adoption of interim 
resolutions (Rule 16) like in the case of Loizidou v. 
Turkey, and it may even lead to the application of Article 
8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, which 
envisages the suspension of the right of representation 
and exclusion from the Council of Europe. Although in 																																								 																					
177 Id.   
178 Borger, supra note 151. 
179 Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and 
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT'L L & INT'L REL. 35, 69–71 (2010–11) (“[N]on-EU 
members such as Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova clearly have a number of outstanding 
human rights issues.” View figures 11 and 12, showing the substantial percentage of cases still 
pending in relation to Turkey, especially considering their late membership to the ECHR.). 
180 Id. at 55–56. See also Christie-Miller, supra note 14. 
181 See Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 179, at 69–71. 
182 See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20 (¶ 5(b)).  
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184 Borger, supra note 151. 
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reality, the second measure has never been used, the 
Committee of Ministers officially brandished the threat 
of exclusion for the first time in Loizidou case. 
Obviously, it would not be desirable for Turkey, as one 
of the founding members of the Council of Europe and 
an EU candidate, to confront the European community 
and its values.”185  
 
But Turkey may already be feeling isolated as its bid to join the 
European Union has not been met with success.186  With a political 
climate of isolation,187 one might wonder, how much Turkey is willing to 
pay to keep Europe’s favor? Turkey was sentenced to pay over 
€33,000,000 for violations committed and brought before the European 
Court of Human Rights in 567 cases between the years of 1990 (when 
Turkey first submitted to having individuals cases brought against it in 
the European Court of Human Rights) and 2006.188 This sum, though 
great, is a mere third of what this one just satisfaction judgment cost 
Turkey.  
While €90,000,000 is ostensibly the largest sum awarded in any one 
just satisfaction case, it appears that the individual relatives of the 
missing people will each be receiving around €20,000, which is not that 
much more than the €12,000 per individual award that the Court awarded 
in the Varnava and Others case.189 “Against the background of the costs 
of the continued military presence of 30,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus, 
the award is also not excessive.”190 
Regardless of the amount of money that the individual Greek-
Cypriots will receive (if they receive anything at all) the purpose of the 
judgment was to show Turkey the high costs of illegal occupation and of 
ignoring the Court’s decisions.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This judgment is the Court’s testament to two important facts: 1) just 
satisfaction claims are not time-barred and can be applied to inter-State 
applications; and 2) the Court will not tolerate aggression or occupation. 
The effects of occupation are long-standing and far-reaching and the 
Court is doing its best to curb Contracting Parties’ partial compliance 
with judgments through large punitive damages. 																																								 																					
185 Toprakseven, supra note 172. See also Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). 
186 Ian Traynor, Turkey's EU membership bid falters as diplomatic row with Germany deepens, 
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The actual impact of this new precedent is yet to be seen. If it was 
the Court’s intention to pressure Turkey into taking general measures to 
prevent human rights violations from occurring in the first place, or from 
continuing in the second place, then Turkey may be feeling the pressure. 
However, Turkey has yet to make an observable response to the Court’s 
actions. In its 2009 annual report, the Committee of Ministers found that 
“the issue of slowness and negligence in execution has attracted special 
attention.”191 Nations, Turkey included, have been slow to take general 
measures to abide by the Court’s judgments.192 While it is rare for a State 
to refuse to pay just satisfaction, State “foot-dragging on general 
measures” is more common.193 While declaratory judgments and fines 
were partially ignored in the past, and while they may continue to be 
ignored in the future, the intent of the Court, as shown through the 
concurring opinion of various judges, is to punish those errant nations 
who simply pay fines but do not change their ways. It may be too soon to 
tell if this will be the tipping point to force Turkey’s hand and a deterrent 
for other nations bent on occupation. As some members of the Court 
noted, “the Court has spoken: it remains for it to be heard.” 194
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